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Abstract
This article assesses the regulatory framework relating to over-the-counter (OTC) sales
of antibiotics for human use in India. The OTC sale of antibiotics is recognised as a
pathway for the emergence of antimicrobial resistance (AMR); a serious public health
challenge in need of urgent regulatory responses. Analytically, this article identifies
opportunities within existing laws in India and highlights gaps that need to be filled by
modifying existing laws or developing new ones. Conceptually, it suggests a need to
reflect on the limits of traditional, top-down, ‘command-and control’ regulation and to
think about alternative approaches. The article therefore advocates for an approach to
regulation that incorporates two elements. First, it argues for a broader concept of
regulation that encompasses binding as well as non-binding regulatory instruments and
initiatives aimed at influencing stakeholder behaviour (including soft regulation, eco-
nomic incentives, information campaigns and uses of technology). Second, it makes the
case for enhanced stakeholder participation in regulatory design. The article will be
relevant for health policy and drug regulators in India and other low- and middle-income
countries, as well as legal scholars, social scientists and others interested in the regu-
lation of OTC sales of antibiotics for AMR containment.
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Antimicrobial resistance (AMR), which refers to the ability of a microorganism to resist
an antimicrobial drug (such as an antibiotic), is a very serious global public health
challenge.1 The 2016 review on AMR, commissioned by the UK government and
chaired by economist Lord O’Neill, estimates that AMR will pose a risk to 10 million
lives a year and a cumulative 100 trillion USD of economic output by 2050 if we do not
act now.2 A major contributing factor, particularly in low-income and middle-income
countries (LMICs), is widespread inappropriate use of antibiotics together with lack of
knowledge about responsible use among many stakeholders.3 The World Health Orga-
nization’s Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (WHO GAP),4 adopted by
the World Health Assembly in 2015, recognises the need for regulation to optimise the
use of antibiotics. WHO member states have created national action plans (NAPs) that
align with the WHO GAP and have begun to put these into effect.5
Against this backdrop of ongoing activity, it is appropriate to take stock of the
challenges that LMICs face in effective design and implementation of AMR NAPs, as
well as to consider possibilities for improving regulatory systems. The global academic
community, policymakers, regulators and other stakeholders could all engage in this
process by sharing knowledge, ideas and insights. Case studies can form a useful starting
point for analysis and discussion. To this end, this review article examines the regulatory
architecture for over-the-counter (OTC) sales of antibiotics for human use in India.
LMICs are important to study for several reasons. Although AMR emergence is a
concern in all countries regardless of income level, LMICs bear a heavier burden.6
Contributory factors include high levels of antibiotic use and misuse, poor access to
quality healthcare, inadequate safe water and sanitation services and high loads of
1. World Health Organization, ‘Antimicrobial Resistance: Key Facts’. Available at: www.who.
int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance (accessed 12 April 2021).
2. The Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, Chaired by Jim O’Neill, Report Commissioned by
the UK Prime Minister, Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally: Final Report and
Recommendations (2016). Available at: https://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/160518_
Final%20paper_with%20cover.pdf (accessed 12 April 2021); see also World Bank, Drug-
Resistant Infections: A Threat to Our Economic Future (2017). Available at: http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/323311493396993758/pdf/final-report.pdf (accessed 12 April
2021).
3. D.K. Byarugaba, ‘A View on Antimicrobial Resistance in Developing Countries
and Responsible Risk Factors’, International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents 24(2) (2004),
pp. 105–110.
4. World Health Organization, Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (2015).
Available at: https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/193736/9789241509763_eng.
pdf?sequence¼1 (accessed 12 April 2021).
5. See, for example, Government of India, National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance
(NAP-AMR) 2017-2021 (2017). Available at: https://ncdc.gov.in/WriteReadData/linkimages/
AMR/File645.pdf (accessed 12 April 2021).
6. S. Pokharel, S. Raut and B. Adhikari, ‘Tackling Antimicrobial Resistance in Low-income and
Middle-income Countries’, BMJ Global Health 4(6) (2019), p. e002104.
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infectious disease in the general population.7 Studies have also shown that LMICs,
especially those in Africa and Asia, have weak AMR surveillance systems due to lack
of appropriate laboratory facilities, gaps in quality assurance, skilled personnel, labora-
tory supplies and management of lab services.8 South East Asia is estimated to have the
highest risk of AMR emergence and spread (e.g. New Delhi metallo-b-lactamase-1).9
Among LMICs, India is of particular interest because it accounts for one-fourth of the
global incidence of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis10 and has one of the highest rates of
antibiotic resistance in bacteria that cause common infections in the community and
healthcare facilities.11 It is also one of the largest producers12 and consumers of anti-
biotics for human use13 and has a high level of mortality due to drug-resistant
pathogens.14
Despite being illegal, OTC sales of antibiotics by pharmacies without a valid pre-
scription from a registered medical practitioner (RMP) appear widespread in India,
highlighting serious problems around the regulation of this pathway for emergence of
AMR. A number of socio-economic and structural drivers common to India and other
LMICs have been identified.15 As a general background factor, the implementation of
7. E.K. Rousham, L. Unicomb and M.A. Islam, ‘Human, Animal and Environmental
Contributors to Antibiotic Resistance in Low-resource Settings: Integrating Behavioural,
Epidemiological and One Health Approaches’, Proceedings of the Royal Society B
285(1876) (2018). DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.0332; J.A. Ayukekbong, M. Ntemgwa and A.
N. Atabe, ‘The Threat of Antimicrobial Resistance in Developing Countries: Causes and
Control Strategies’, Antimicrobial Resistance & Infection Control 6(47) (2017). https://doi.
org/10.1186/s13756-017-0208-x.
8. S. Gandra et al., ‘Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance in Low- and Middle-Income
Countries: Progress and Challenges in Eight South Asian and Southeast Asian Countries’,
Clinical Microbiology Reviews 33(3) (2020), pp. e00048-19.
9. E. Yam et al., ‘Antimicrobial Resistance in the Asia Pacific Region: A Meeting Report’,
Antimicrobial Resistance & Infection Control 8(202) (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s13
756-019-0654-8Y.
10. S. Chatterjee, H. Poonawala and Y. Jain, ‘Drug-resistant Tuberculosis: Is India Ready for the
Challenge?’, BMJ Global Health 3(4) (2018). https://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-
000971.
11. R. Laxminarayan and R.R. Chaudhury, ‘Antibiotic Resistance in India: Drivers and
Opportunities for Action’, PLoS Medicine 13(3) (2016). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pmed.1001974.
12. Srividhya, ‘Indian Pharmaceuticals: A Formula for Success’. Available at: www.investindia.
gov.in/sector/pharmaceuticals/ Invest India (accessed 12 April 2021).
13. E.Y. Klein et al., ‘Global Increase and Geographic Convergence in Antibiotic Consumption
between 2000 and 2015’, Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America 115(15) (2018), pp. E3463–E3470.
14. S. Gandra et al., ‘The Mortality Burden of Multidrug-resistant Pathogens in India:
A Retrospective, Observational Study’, Clinical Infectious Diseases 69(4) (2019), pp. 563–570.
15. M.H.F. Sakeena et al., ‘Non-prescription Sales of Antimicrobial Agents at Community
Pharmacies in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review’, International Journal of
Antimicrobial Agents 52(6) (2018), pp. 771–782.
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national medicines regulations is poor. India has a legal framework that requires a valid
prescription as a condition for the sale of antibiotics, but compliance is low and regu-
latory enforcement is patchy.16 On the supply side, pharmacies – as businesses – are
subject to commercial pressures. The desire to maximise profits and concerns about
losing a sale or a customer to a rival pharmacy motivate the dispensing of antibiotics
without a valid prescription.17 Pharmaceutical companies’ drug promotion programmes
may also influence dispensing practices by making it more profitable to sell certain
newer, branded antibiotics.18 Additionally, while regulations require the presence of a
qualified pharmacist on-site during opening hours, in practice, pharmacy owners do not
always adhere to this rule; nor is it enforced rigorously by government agencies.19 As a
result, antibiotics are often dispensed by staff who lack medical qualifications and have
inadequate knowledge of drug safety and efficacy.
On the demand side, a range of factors prompt patients to seek antibiotics from
pharmacists directly.20 Patients in remote, rural areas may not be able to access a doctor
easily to obtain a diagnosis and prescription, so turn instead to a pharmacy as their first
point of medical care.21 Although patients in urban areas are in closer proximity to
physicians, they may also choose to seek medication at pharmacies to avoid lengthy
waiting times in the overstretched public health system.22 Poorer patients may be unable
to afford both medicines and doctors’ consultation fees, so have little choice but to obtain
their medicines from pharmacists without a prescription.23 Self-medication is therefore
commonplace. Patients’ choices about which antibiotics to take may be based on previous
prescriptions given to them by doctors or on recommendations from pharmacy staff (who
are thought to possess good medical knowledge).24 Members of the public may also
believe mistakenly that it is appropriate to use antibiotics to treat non-bacterial infections,
16. Laxminarayan and Chaudhury, ‘Antibiotic Resistance in India’, p. 4.
17. A. Kotwani et al., ‘Irrational Use of Antibiotics and Role of the Pharmacist: An Insight from
a Qualitative Study in New Delhi, India’, Journal of Clinical Pharmacy and Therapeutics
37(3) (2012), pp. 308–312.
18. Op. cit., p. 310.
19. A.K. Barker et al., ‘What Drives Inappropriate Antibiotic Dispensing? A Mixed-methods
Study of Pharmacy Employee Perspectives in Haryana, India’, BMJ Open 7(3) (2017). http://
dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2016-013190.
20. A. Kotwani et al., ‘Knowledge and Behavior of Consumers Towards the Non-prescription
Purchase of Antibiotics: An Insight from a Qualitative Study from New Delhi, India’,
Pharmacy Practice 19(1) (2021). https://doi.org/10.18549/PharmPract.2021.1.2206.
21. Barker et al., ‘What Drives Inappropriate Antibiotic Dispensing?’, p. 1.
22. A. Kotwani et al., ‘Prescriber and Dispenser Perceptions about Antibiotic Use in Acute
Uncomplicated Childhood Diarrhea and Upper Respiratory Tract Infection in New Delhi:
Qualitative Study’, Indian Journal of Pharmacology 49(6) (2017), pp. 419–431; J. Wallen,
‘Indian Government Doubles Health Budget after Covid Exposes Long-term Underfunding’,
The Telegraph, February 1, 2021.
23. Kotwani et al., ‘Irrational Use of Antibiotics and Role of the Pharmacist’, p. 310.
24. A. Rajendran et al., ‘Prevalence and Pattern of Antibiotic Self-Medication Practice in an
Urban Population of Kerala, India: A Cross-sectional Study’, Indian Journal of Community
Medicine 44(1) (2019), pp. S42–S45.
150 Medical Law International 21(2)
such as viral fevers.25 Finally, both pharmacy staff and their customers may have low
awareness of AMR and be ambivalent about the health risks posed to themselves and the
wider community by the inappropriate and unnecessary use of antibiotics.26
The current regulatory framework governing the sale of antibiotics in India and any
upcoming reforms will need to grapple with all these contextualised factors and beha-
viours to be effective. With this goal in mind, this review article adds to the growing
body of literature by providing an up-to-date map of the Indian regulatory landscape for
OTC sales of antibiotics. Analytically, it identifies opportunities for ensuring responsible
antibiotic use within existing laws relating directly or indirectly to OTC sales of anti-
biotics for human use. It also highlights gaps that need to be filled by modifying existing
laws or developing new ones. The initiatives set out within India’s National Action Plan
on Antimicrobial Resistance (NAP-AMR) (2017-2022) – and the way it conceptualises
regulation more generally – are also presented and discussed.
In terms of historical context, it is important to note that the current Indian NAP-AMR
follows an earlier proposed National Antibiotic Policy that was shelved due to difficul-
ties of implementation.27 This suggests a need to reflect on the limits of traditional, top-
down, ‘command-and control’ regulation in this context and consider alternative
approaches. Lessons from other countries also suggest that stricter enforcement of cur-
rent regulation alone may not be effective.28 This review article therefore advocates for
an approach to regulation that incorporates two elements: first, a broader concept of
regulation that encompasses binding as well as non-binding regulatory instruments and
initiatives aimed at influencing stakeholder behaviour (including soft regulation, eco-
nomic incentives, information campaigns and uses of technology);29 and second,
enhanced stakeholder participation in regulatory design. Incorporating these two ele-
ments could help produce a regulatory framework that is better suited to the realities on
the ground in India and therefore more effective. Ideally, robust stakeholder consultation
would be used as an opportunity to understand stakeholders’ interests and the likely
impact of regulatory changes. The suitability of transplanting regulatory initiatives used
25. Kotwani et al., ‘Knowledge and Behavior of Consumers Towards the Non-prescription
Purchase of Antibiotics’, p. 5.
26. A.K. Barker et al., ‘Social Determinants of Antibiotic Misuse: A Qualitative Study of
Community Members in Haryana, India’, BMC Public Health 17(333) (2017). https://doi.
org/10.1186/s12889-017-4261-4.
27. A. Ghafur et al., ‘The Chennai Declaration: A Roadmap to Tackle the Challenge of
Antimicrobial Resistance’, Indian Journal of Cancer 50(1) (2013), pp. 71–73.
28. T.G. Jacobs et al., ‘Assessing the Impact of Law Enforcement to Reduce Over-the-counter
(OTC) Sales of Antibiotics in Low- and Middle-income Countries: A Systematic Literature
Review’, BMC Health Services Research 19(536) (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12913-
019-4359-8; V.J. Wirtz et al., ‘Analysing Policy Interventions to Prohibit Over-the-counter
Antibiotic Sales in Four Latin American Countries’, Tropical Medicine and International
Health 18(6) (2013), pp. 665–673.
29. G. Porter et al., ‘Using ‘Smart Regulation’ to Tackle Antimicrobial Resistance in Low-
income and Middle-income Countries’, BMJ Global Health 5(1) (2020). http://dx.doi.org/
10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001864.
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in other countries into the Indian context could also be assessed, or novel interventions
co-designed in an iterative way through stakeholder input. We anticipate that the review
article will be of interest and relevance for health policy and drug regulators in India and
other LMICs, as well as legal scholars, social scientists and others whose work intersects
with the regulation of OTC sales of antibiotics for human use as an aspect of AMR
containment.
‘Regulation’, regulatory actors and instruments
Before exploring the regulatory architecture concerning OTC sales of antibiotics for
human use in India in detail, it is useful to set out the understanding of ‘regulation’
adopted in this review article, the relevant actors/institutions and types of binding and
non-binding government-led regulatory instruments, and to highlight the role of courts.
‘Regulation’ is a term that lacks a single unifying definition and has been used in a
variety of contrasting ways.30 If we consider the traditional, narrow perspective on
regulation as ‘the promulgation of a binding set of rules to be applied by a body devoted
to this purpose’,31 the actors involved in the regulation of OTC sales of antibiotics for
human use in India are the national and state governments, and authorities constituted
under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (DCA) and the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules,
1945 (DCR) on the one hand (the regulators), and dispensers of antibiotics such as drug
stores, chemists or druggists and pharmacists on the other (the regulated entities dis-
cussed in the second section).
By contrast, if we adopt a broader view of regulation as ‘all mechanisms affecting
behaviour – whether these be state-based or from other sources (e.g. markets)’,32 we find
that a wide array of actors/institutions influence, and are affected by, the regulation of OTC
sales of antibiotics for human use in India. These include e-pharmacies and their associa-
tions, medical practitioners in government and private hospitals and clinics and their
associations, councils established pursuant to legislation at the central and state levels to
regulate the education and practice of pharmacists and medical practitioners, consumers,
non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and religious organisa-
tions, as well as unregistered pharmacists and medical practitioners. In addition, pharma-
ceutical manufacturers, sellers, distributors and wholesalers could influence antibiotic
prescribing/dispensing behaviour as well as disposal practices of pharmacists.
The main sources of government-led regulation that apply to several of the above-
mentioned actors are the legislature and the executive. The former includes Parliament at
the national level and state legislature at the state level, and the latter include government
institutions at the central, state and union territory levels. The legislature enacts binding
primary legislation (also known as a statute or an Act) and the executive enacts binding
secondary legislation such as rules, regulations, notifications and orders. The executive
30. J. Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation
in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World’, Current Legal Problems 54(1) (2001), pp. 103–146.
31. R. Baldwin, M. Cave and M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and
Practice. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3.
32. Op. cit., p. 3.
152 Medical Law International 21(2)
also issues administrative instructions such as letters, circulars, orders, memoranda,
pamphlets, public notices and press notices, as well as policies, programmes and cam-
paigns. In terms of the force of these regulatory instruments, administrative instructions
may or may not be legally binding depending on whether or not they have statutory
backing, and policies, programmes and campaigns are not legally binding.
Focusing on the executive branch at the national level, the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare is the primary source of many of the binding and non-binding regulatory
instruments that concern OTC sales of antibiotics for human use in India. The Directo-
rate General of Health Services (DGHS) is responsible for the provision of evidence-
based technical support for policy formulation and programme implementation in
matters of public health, healthcare and medical education to the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare. Under the auspices of the DGHS, the Central Drugs Standard Control
Organisation (CDSCO) is the national regulatory authority responsible for the DCA and
the DCR. The Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI) heads the CDSCO and sets
quality standards for the import, manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs in India. In
addition, the Department of Pharmaceuticals within the Ministry of Chemicals and
Fertilisers is responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies relating to
drugs, especially drug prices and access.
The judiciary plays a significant role in enforcement in India. In addition to issuing
fines or other penalties for violation of the laws relating to the sale of antibiotics without
a valid prescription, courts have also ordered the executive branch to fulfil the duty to
implement these laws when efforts have been lacking.33 In some instances, judicial
activism led to the modification of existing laws or the development of new laws relating
to the sale of antibiotics.34 In general, however, the judiciary is reluctant to interfere with
the policymaking powers of the executive.35 Court decisions are often mandatory and
legally binding but sometimes they may be declaratory instead.
33. ‘Do Not Sell Drugs without Proper Prescription: J&K HC Tells Pharmacists’, United News of
India, September 14, 2018; Bureau, ‘Mumbai-based Lawyer Files PIL Against Drug
Regulators for Unregulated Sale of Prescription Medicines’, Pharmabiz.com, October 23,
2018. Available at: http://www.pharmabiz.com/NewsDetails.aspx?aid¼111867&sid¼1/
(accessed 12 April 2021).
34. South Chemists & Distributors Association v. Union of India & Others Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 10611 of 2018 (High Court of Delhi); Tamil Nadu Chemists and Druggists Association v.
Union of India & Others Writ Petition No. 28716 of 2018 (Madras High Court). On judicial
activism in India, see generally P.N. Bhagwati, ‘Judicial Activism and Public Interest
Litigation’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 23(3) (1984), pp. 561–578; R.
Abeyratne and D. Misri, ‘Separation of Powers and the Potential for Constitutional
Dialogue in India’, Journal of International and Comparative Law 5(2) (2018), pp. 363–386.
35. See, for example, S. Subramanian, ‘The Indian Supreme Court Ruling in Koushal v. Naz:
Judicial Deference or Judicial Abdication’, George Washington International Law Review
47(4) (2015), pp. 711–762; M. Mate, ‘Globalization, Rights, and Judicial Review in the
Supreme Court of India’, Washington International Law Journal 25(3) (2016), pp. 643–
673.
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Overview of the regulatory framework
This section examines laws that have a bearing on OTC sales of antibiotics for human
use in India. Some of these laws concern actors including pharmacists as the dispensers
of antibiotics. Others relate to the education and practice of pharmacists and some to the
manufacturers of antibiotics.
The DCA and the associated DCR are key pieces of legislation that regulate the import,
manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs in India. They inter alia govern the dispensing
practices of pharmacies. Schedule H of the DCR lists 521 drugs (including antibiotics) that
can only be sold against a prescription from a registered medical practitioner (RMP).
Nevertheless, there has been a long-standing and widespread practice of OTC sales of
antibiotics without a valid prescription. As an early response to the need to address the
challenge posed by AMR, the Government of India introduced the National Policy for
Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance 2011.36 This policy proposed some actions to
monitor the sale of antibiotics such as the development of a separate list of OTC drugs
including the quantity to be dispensed. In 2014, this led to the addition of Schedule H1 to
the DCR, which listed 48 drugs as of 2020; the majority of which are antibiotics.
It is worth noting that the initial plan to give Schedule H1 an exclusive focus on
antibiotics became somewhat weakened; drugs other than antibiotics, such as habit-
forming medicines, also came to be included in the approved, final version.37 Further-
more, while the requirements for Schedule H1 drugs are more burdensome than Sched-
ule H, they are less onerous than those stipulated in Schedule X (which deals with
drugs including narcotics and sedatives and mandates duplicate prescriptions to be
retained for 2 years). The discussion in this section focuses on Schedule H and
Schedule H1.
Dispensers of antibiotics
The DCA prohibits the sale of all drugs including drugs listed in Schedule H and
Schedule H1 of the DCR without a licence.38 The DCR sets out the general conditions
of the licence for dispensers of antibiotics in both schedules.39 Drugs included in Sched-
ule H and Schedule H1 are to be sold on the written prescription of an RMP and only by
or under the personal supervision of a registered pharmacist. The RMP must sign and
date the prescription, specify the patient’s name and address and indicate the total
amount and dosage of the medicine to be supplied on the prescription. The DCR and
the Pharmacy Act, 1948 define the terms RMP and ‘medical practitioner’ respectively,40
36. Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government
of India, National Policy for Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance 2011 (2011).
Available at: www.nhp.gov.in/sites/default/files/pdf/National_policy_for_containment_of_
antimicrobial_resistance.pdf (accessed 12 April 2021).
37. Op. cit.
38. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 (as amended 31st December, 2016) [DCA], section 18.
39. The Drugs and Cosmetics Rules 1945 (as amended 31st December, 2016) [DCR], rule 65.
40. DCR, rule 2 and Pharmacy Act 1948, section 2.
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and the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, 2015 define a ‘registered pharmacist’ and
‘prescription’.41
Broadly, the DCR identifies three categories of licensees.42 These are pharmacy/phar-
macist/dispensing chemist/pharmaceutical chemist; chemists; and druggists and drugstore.
The first two categories require the services of a registered pharmacist. This means that
drugstores cannot dispense antibiotics included in Schedule H and Schedule H1. The DCR
also imposes several conditions on the licensees who can supply the drugs listed in
Schedule H and Schedule H1, including antibiotics.43 They must enter certain details in
a separate prescription register or a cash or credit memo book specifically maintained for
the purpose. Further, the person dispensing a prescription must follow the prescriber’s
directions as stated on the prescription. There are some concerns, however, in terms of
inadequacy or absence of relevant provisions. For example, the dispenser is not required to
stamp the prescription,44 or to retain it,45 which would prevent its subsequent reuse.
For Schedule H1 drugs, the DCR imposes some additional conditions.46 The supplier
of a drug is required to record the supply in a separate register. They are also required to
maintain these records for 3 years and the records are open for inspection. By contrast,
the licensee is required to preserve all registers and other records in respect of other drugs
including those in Schedule H for just 2 years. Although the government had initially
planned to require double prescriptions for Schedule H1 drugs, as is the case with
Schedule X drugs, this proposal was dropped following opposition from industry asso-
ciations and medical practitioners concerned about the practicalities of implementation
and potential loss of revenue.47
Scholars have questioned the underlying rationale for listing certain antibiotics within
Schedule H as opposed to the somewhat more demanding Schedule H1.48 There is also a
degree of uncertainty as to whether all antibiotics are indeed covered comprehensively
within either Schedule H or Schedule H1. Line 32 of Schedule H lists ‘antibiotics’ in
broad terms in a single line. Yet in addition to this, some antibiotics are given separate,
individual listings in either Schedule H or Schedule H1, but other commonly used
antibiotics (including gentamicin and tigecycline) are not mentioned.49 Arguably, if the
individual listing of antibiotics within Schedule H and Schedule H1 serves a valid
41. The Pharmacy Practice Regulations 2015, regulation 2.
42. DCR, rule 65.
43. Op. cit.
44. Kotwani et al., ‘Prescriber and Dispenser Perceptions about Antibiotic Use in Acute
Uncomplicated Childhood Diarrhea and Upper Respiratory Tract Infection in New Delhi’.
45. Jacobs et al., ‘Assessing the Impact of Law Enforcement to Reduce Over-the-counter (OTC)
Sales of Antibiotics in Low- and Middle-income Countries’, p. 10.
46. DCR, rule 65.
47. J. Alexander , ‘Schedule H1 Antibiotics to be Limited to Only 48 Instead of 91 Proposed
Earlier’, July 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.pharmabiz.com/NewsDetails.aspx?
aid¼76395&sid¼1/ (accessed 12 April 2021).
48. A. Hazra, ‘Schedule H1: Hope or Hype?’, Indian Journal of Pharmacology 46(4) (2014), pp.
361–362.
49. Laxminarayan and Chaudhury, ‘Antibiotic Resistance in India’, p. 4.
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purpose and is not merely superfluous, then this raises scope for interpretation around the
legal coverage of unlisted antibiotics, which may or may not be covered by the catch-all
provision of line 32 in Schedule H.50
Tandon et al. have recommended a thorough revision of the various drug classifica-
tion schedules in the DCR, with all antibiotics being listed across two dedicated classes:
a ‘regular’ group and another group for higher antibiotics reserved for the most serious
infections.51 In a similar fashion, the NAP-AMR has established a requirement to review
the categorisation of high-end antimicrobials as well as new antibiotics in Schedule X
and Schedule H1 of the DCR. An alternative approach would be to revise the listings of
antibiotics in the schedules (and perhaps the relative strictness of the legal requirements
for sale) so as to reflect the WHO Access, Watch and Reserve categories.52 This clas-
sifies antibiotics into three stewardship groups according to the importance of their
optimal uses and potential for AMR.53 Additionally, Tandon et al. have also suggested
that sales of antibiotics should be recorded on a portal-based monitoring system. These
reforms would offer advantages in terms of giving a clearer symbolic focus on antibiotics
and the possibility of easier monitoring by regulators; assuming that transactions for
antibiotics would indeed be recorded on the portal.
Enforcement of the DCA/DCR in relation to pharmacies
The provisions of the DCA/DCR have the potential to deter activities that lead to misuse
or overuse of antibiotics. Within Indian states, it is the duty of state drug inspectors to
inspect all premises licensed for the sale of drugs and to satisfy themselves that licensees
are observing the conditions of the licence.54 They are also empowered to conduct
searches and seize drugs.55 Further, the concerned licensing authority could suspend
or cancel the licence where the licensee fails to comply with any of the conditions of the
licence to sell or distribute drugs or with any provisions of the DCA/DCR.56 The Central
Licensing Approving Authority could also direct the licensee to stop the sale or distri-
bution of the drugs and order their destruction.57 The DCA specifies penalties
50. P. Tandon et al., ‘A Review on the Current Classification and Regulatory Provisions for
Medicines in Drug and Cosmetic Act, in the light of Present Day Context’, International
Archives of BioMedical and Clinical Research 3(3) (2017). Available at: https://iabcr.org/
index.php/iabcr/article/view/66/64.
51. Op. cit., p.4.
52. World Health Organization, The 2019 WHO AWaRe Classification of Antibiotics for
Evaluation and Monitoring of Use (Geneva: WHO, 2019).
53. Op cit; S. Gandra and A. Kotwani, ‘Need to Improve Availability of “Access” Group
Antibiotics and Reduce the Use of “Watch” Group Antibiotics in India for Optimum Use
of Antibiotics to Contain Antimicrobial Resistance’, Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and
Practice 12(20) (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40545-019-0182-1.
54. DCR, rule 65B.
55. DCA, section 21.
56. DCR, rules 66 & 85.
57. Op. cit., rule 85.
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(imprisonment and/or fine) in respect of certain first and subsequent offences, including
the sale of any drug without a valid licence or of any other drug in contravention of the
DCA/DCR.58 It further provides for confiscation of the stock of the drug in respect of
which a court has convicted a person.59
Ultimately, however, the effectiveness of these provisions is contingent upon their
active and effective enforcement by statutory authorities and compliance by regulated
entities. Inspectors can check the details of antibiotics sold by pharmacists in the Sched-
ule H1 register, but they will not have an accurate picture of antibiotic sales if these
transactions go unrecorded. Further, the DCA/DCR do not provide for approaches to
influence behaviour besides sanctions (in the forms of suspension/cancellation of
licences, fines or imprisonment).
The CDSCO, however, recognises the important role of awareness in its advi-
sories to different stakeholders seeking compliance with provisions relating to OTC
sales of antibiotics under the DCA/DCR. It has advised all state drug controllers and
pharmaceutical and consumer associations to comply strictly with the statutory
requirements including stringent regulatory action on OTC sales without prescrip-
tion of antibiotics.60 According to CDSCO, stakeholders should raise awareness
through consumer associations about the side effects of taking antibiotics without
prescription to avoid AMR for the safety, well-being and protection of patients’
health. In addition, the DGHS/DCGI released an advisory on rational use of anti-
biotics for limiting AMR and provided details of regulatory steps taken by the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to curb and control indiscriminate use of
antibiotics.61 The DGHS/DCGI also recommended that all state drugs controllers
sensitise their enforcement officials to be vigilant in ensuring that such drugs are not
sold by retail without a prescription from an RMP. This approach to raising aware-
ness among regulators and stakeholders will be important to consider alongside any
measures aimed at stricter enforcement of the existing laws. A further specific
concern, however, is that the dispensing of drugs (including antibiotics) is often
conducted by people who lack the relevant educational qualifications. This issue is
discussed in the following subsection.
58. DCA, sections 27–30.
59. Op. cit., section 31.
60. Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation, Directorate General of Health Services,
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Notice with Respect to
Antimicrobial Resistance dated 16.01.2017. Available at: https://cdsco.gov.in/opencms/
opencms/system/modules/CDSCO.WEB/elements/download_file_division.jsp?num_
id¼ODc3 (accessed 12 April 2021).
61. Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation, Directorate General of Health Services,
Government of India, Advisory: Rational Use of Antibiotics for Limiting Antimicrobial
Resistance (23 December 2019). Available at: https://cdsco.gov.in/opencms/opencms/
system/modules/CDSCO.WEB/elements/download_file_division.jsp?num_id¼NTM3
Nw¼¼ (accessed 12 April 2021).
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Education and practice of pharmacists
Compliance with existing or revised laws is contingent, among other factors, on the
awareness and education of pharmacists about rational use of antibiotics and AMR.62
There is also a correlation between comprehensive and relevant education and training of
pharmacists on the use of antibiotics and AMR and change in the behaviour of con-
sumers regarding antibiotic consumption.63 The Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) is a
statutory body incorporated under the Pharmacy Act, 1948 to regulate pharmacy edu-
cation and the profession of pharmacy in India. The discharge of its statutory mandate
could therefore influence the regulation of OTC sales of antibiotics.
The minimum standard of education required for qualifying and registering as a
pharmacist and the curriculum norms are set out in different regulations made under section
10 of the Pharmacy Act. The norms do not include AMR as a separate/core component of
any subject. Similarly, the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the regulations made
thereunder govern the education and practice of medical practitioners, but they do not
incorporate specific provisions in respect of education and training on the rational use of
antibiotics as well as AMR that could influence prescription practices. An amendment to
these laws and the regulations made thereunder, which govern the education and practice of
medical practitioners and pharmacists, respectively, could incorporate specific provisions in
respect of education and training on the rational use of antibiotics as well as AMR. Such
measures would be consistent with the steps outlined in the NAP-AMR regarding the
improvement of professional education and training (see the third section).
Chapter IV of the Pharmacy Act requires the registration of pharmacists by state
pharmacy councils. According to the Act, only a registered pharmacist shall dispense
a medicine on the prescription of a medical practitioner.64 The Pharmacy Practice
Regulations 2015 also provide for dispensation of medicine against prescription of an
RMP by a Registered Pharmacist.65 There is some room for confusion here because the
DCR offers wider scope; providing that a drug shall be supplied on the prescription of an
RMP only by or under the personal supervision of a registered pharmacist.66 In chapter 2
of these regulations, the PCI prescribes a code of ethics for its members, which includes
several provisions that are applicable to OTC sales of antibiotics for human use. Of
course, the ability and willingness of pharmacists to discharge these obligations is con-
tingent upon their awareness of issues relating to OTC sales of antibiotics for human use
and AMR, as well as their commercial interests.67
62. M.R. Paes and S. De Sa, ‘Drug Dispensing Practices in Private Pharmacies in Goa’, National
Journal of Physiology Pharmacy and Pharmacology 8(4) (2018), pp. 507–511.
63. M.H.F. Sakeena, A.A. Bennett and A.J. McLachlan, ‘Enhancing Pharmacists’ Role in
Developing Countries to Overcome the Challenge of Antimicrobial Resistance: A
Narrative Review’, Antimicrobial Resistance & Infection Control 7(63) (2018). https://doi.
org/10.1186/s13756-018-0351-z.
64. Pharmacy Act, section 42.
65. Pharmacy Practice Regulations, regulation 4.3.
66. DCR, rule 65.
67. Kotwani et al., ‘Irrational Use of Antibiotics and Role of the Pharmacist’.
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Continuing pharmacy education programmes could provide an avenue for the dis-
semination of information relating to OTC sales of antibiotics for human use and AMR
among pharmacists. Some provisions of the Pharmacy Practice Regulations are relevant
here. First, for renewal of registration, the pharmacist is required to attend a minimum of
two refresher courses in pharmacy, having a minimum of 1-day duration each within a
span of five years.68 These courses are organised by the PCI, state pharmacy councils,
Central Government, state governments or a professional body recognised by the PCI.
Second, a registered pharmacist shall participate in professional meetings as part of
Continuing Pharmacy Education programmes organised by reputed professional aca-
demic bodies or any other authorised associations/organisations and regularly inform the
PCI or the state pharmacy council of compliance.69 Third, to promote rational use of
drugs, the pharmacist shall be involved in activities such as updating the knowledge of
drugs through continuing education programmes.70 In practice, most dispensers obtain
their information or update their information in informal ways such as through sales
representatives, peers or physicians.71 In an evolving regulatory environment, drug
inspectors could appraise pharmacists of legal requirements and any changes thereto.72
At present, there are no binding laws to govern the manufacturers, sellers and dis-
tributors of antibiotics who seek to influence dispensing practices of pharmacists through
various forms of inducements.73 However, the Pharmacy Practice Regulations provide
that registered pharmacists/ pharmacy shall not (or not offer to) give, solicit or receive
any gift, gratuity, commission or bonus in consideration of or return for referring,
recommending or procuring of any patient for sale/dispensing of medicines.74
Under the Pharmacy Practice Regulations, it is the duty of registered pharmacists to
disseminate advice on public health issues, enforce the laws of the country and cooperate
with the authorities in the administration of sanitary/public health laws and regulations.75
However, awareness and education by themselves may not necessarily lead to voluntary
compliance with laws. For instance, a study of pharmacists in Goa found that they are
aware of Schedule H and Schedule H1 of the DCR but they do not follow the legal
68. Pharmacy Practice Regulations, regulation 4.2.
69. Op. cit., regulation 6.1.
70. Op. cit., regulation 9.2.
71. V. Dua, C.M. Kunin and L.V. White, ‘The Use of Antimicrobial Drugs in Nagpur, India. A
Window on Medical Care in a Developing Country’, Social Science and Medicine 38(5)
(1994), pp. 717–724; R. Soumya et al., ‘Drug Dispensing Practices at Pharmacies in
Bengaluru: A Cross-sectional Study’, Indian Journal of Pharmacology 48(4) (2016), pp.
360–364; Kotwani et al., ‘Prescriber and Dispenser Perceptions about Antibiotic Use in
Acute Uncomplicated Childhood Diarrhea and Upper Respiratory Tract Infection in New
Delhi’.
72. Jacobs et al., ‘Assessing the Impact of Law Enforcement to Reduce Over-the-Counter (OTC)
Sales of Antibiotics in Low- and Middle-income Countries’.
73. See, for example D. Pearl and S. Stecklow, ‘Drug Firms’ Incentives Fuel Abuse by
Pharmacists in India’, The Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2001.
74. Pharmacy Practice Regulations, regulation 12.2.
75. Op. cit., regulation 7.
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requirements in respect of record-keeping.76 Current enforcement mechanisms should
therefore be re-examined.
Enforcement of the Pharmacy Act and related instruments
The Pharmacy Act empowers state pharmacy councils to appoint pharmacy inspectors,
with the previous sanction of the state government and sets out their powers and func-
tions.77 These inspectors can inspect any premises where drugs are dispensed and submit
a written report to the Registrar (who is the Secretary of the state pharmacy council),
enquire whether a person who is engaged in dispensing of drugs is a registered pharma-
cist, investigate any complaint made in writing in respect of any contravention of the
Pharmacy Act and report to the Registrar, and institute prosecution. However, failure to
monitor compliance and non-enforcement is widespread, due to reasons that include the
failure of state pharmacy councils to appoint pharmacy inspectors.78
To promote compliance with the above-mentioned provisions of binding regulatory
instruments, the CDSCO also relies on certain softer instruments. For instance, it
released an advisory asking the All India Organisation of Chemists and Druggists, a
representative body of pharmaceutical retail and wholesale traders, to educate its mem-
bers to follow conditions of licence for sale of drugs strictly and cooperate with reg-
ulatory authorities to prevent such sale of drugs, and the pharmaceutical industry to use
their well-developed marketing network to discourage pharmacists from selling antibio-
tics without prescription.79 The CDSCO also requested different statutory councils
including the PCI to sensitise their members about the rational use of antibiotics.80 In
addition, it advised the supply chain system once again to comply strictly with the
statutory requirements.81
76. Paes and De Sa, ‘Drug Dispensing Practices in Private Pharmacies in Goa’.
77. Pharmacy Act, section 26A.
78. P.A. Francis, ‘Pharmacy Inspectors in States’, Pharmabiz.com, July 16, 2014. Available at:
http://www.pharmabiz.com/NewsDetails.aspx?aid¼82953&sid¼3/ (accessed 12 April
2021).
79. Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Government of India, Advisory: Rational Use of Antibiotics for Limiting Antimicrobial
Resistance (1 February 2017). Available at: https://cdsco.gov.in/opencms/resources/
UploadCDSCOWeb/2018/UploadPublic_NoticesFiles/Combine.pdf (accessed 12 April
2021).
80. Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation, Directorate General of Health Services,
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Advisory: Rational Use of
Antibiotics for Limiting Antimicrobial Resistance (1 February 2017). Available at: https://
cdsco.gov.in/opencms/opencms/system/modules/CDSCO.WEB/elements/download_file_
division.jsp? num_id¼ODc2 (accessed 12 April 2021).
81. Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation, Directorate General of Health Services,
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, Notice (15 December
2018). Available at: https://cdsco.gov.in/opencms/opencms/system/modules/CDSCO.
WEB/elements/download_file_division.jsp? num_id¼NDA5Ng¼¼ (accessed 12 April
2021).
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The Pharmacy Act also creates sanctions for certain offences such as falsely claiming to
be registered in the state register, dispensing by unregistered persons, failure to surrender a
certificate of registration and wilfully obstructing an inspector in exercise of statutory
powers.82 The Act also identifies the relevant adjudicatory authorities. Yet the reality is
that non-state, autonomous bodies such as the PCI and state pharmacy councils are reluc-
tant to take action against their own members.83 In any case, the low likelihood of
prosecution and level of fines are unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect.
Violations of the code of conduct set out in the Pharmacy Practice Regulations
constitute professional misconduct and render the registered pharmacist liable for dis-
ciplinary action by the PCI. The regulations do not elaborate on the nature of the penalty
but temporary or permanent removal from the register of pharmacists is a possibility.
These provisions, however, remain unenforced because several states are yet to imple-
ment these regulations.
Manufacturers of antibiotics
The DCR prohibits the sale or distribution of the antibiotics included in Schedule H and
Schedule H1 without a label and sets out labelling requirements. The label of the inner-
most container of a medicine for internal use containing these drugs and every other
covering in which the container is packed must be labelled with the symbol Rx and
conspicuously displayed on the left top corner of the label. The container must also be
labelled with a specific caution, in legible black coloured font size in a completely red
rectangular box, without disturbing the other conditions printed on the label.
As in the case of licensing requirements, there are some differences in the labelling
requirements for Schedule H drugs and Schedule H1 drugs. For Schedule H drugs, there
is no requirement in respect of the colour of the symbol Rx, and the caution reads as
follows: ‘SCHEDULE H PRESCRIPTION DRUG – CAUTION. Not to be sold by retail
without the prescription of a Registered Medical Practitioner’. By contrast, for Schedule
H1 drugs, the symbol Rx must be red in colour and the caution shall read: ‘SCHEDULE
H1 PRESCRIPTION DRUG – CAUTION. It is dangerous to take this preparation except
in accordance with the medical advice. Not to be sold by retail without the prescription of
a Registered Medical Practitioner’.
These labelling requirements emerged following the ‘Medicines with the Red Line’
campaign, developed by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare along with the Orga-
nisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, which represents the research-based phar-
maceutical companies in India, to create public awareness on rational use of antibiotics,
and launched in February 2016.84 A vertical red line on the packaging indicated to the
82. Pharmacy Act, sections 41–43 and section 26A, respectively.
83. K. Sheikh, P.S. Saligram and K. Hort, ‘What Explains Regulatory Failure? Analysing the
Architecture of Health Care Regulation in Two Indian States’, Health Policy and Planning
30(1) (2015), pp. 39–55, at p. 42.
84. D. Banerjee and A. Raghunathan, ‘Knowledge, Attitude and Practice of Antibiotic Use and
Antimicrobial Resistance: A Study post the ‘Red Line’ Initiative’, Current Science 114(9)
(2018), pp. 1866–1877.
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dispensing pharmacist as well as patients that these medicines are dispensed only on
prescription. The campaign had several key messages: learning how to identify prescrip-
tion drugs, curbing self-medication and becoming more aware of the dangers of misusing
antibiotics.85 The Red Line campaign also illustrates the influence of non-binding regu-
latory measures on the development of binding regulatory provisions.
Regulatory instruments in the pipeline
So far, we have focused on existing binding regulatory instruments. Clearly, this reg-
ulatory framework does not address all aspects of OTC sales of antibiotics for human use
in India. Regulatory instruments are in the pipeline to address gaps relating to
e-pharmacies and the promotion and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs by pharmaceu-
tical companies before healthcare professionals.
First, in recent years, e-pharmacies or Internet pharmacies have emerged as an alter-
native, quick and easy source of access to antibiotics for consumers in India. They
operate, however, within a regulatory grey area.86 In August 2018, the Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare circulated a draft amendment to the DCR for the insertion of a new
‘Part VIB – Sale of Drugs by E-Pharmacy’ to regulate online sale of medicines.87 This
part will include provisions for registration of e-pharmacies, maintenance of record of
cash or credit memo against which any drug is supplied, inspection every 2 years and
monitoring. In February 2019, the Central Government sought a 6-month extension from
the Mumbai High Court to publish the final rules.88 At the time of writing, the draft rules
are still pending approval.
Second, there is currently no regulation of promotion and marketing of pharmaceutical
drugs by pharmaceutical companies before healthcare professionals. The Central Govern-
ment was contemplating introduction of the Draft Essential Commodities (Control of
Unethical Practices in Marketing of Drugs) Order, 2017, which would be legally binding.
The Ministry of Law and Justice, however, rejected the proposal of putting the draft under
the Essential Commodities Act 1955 in December 2018 (perhaps because it is outside the
core objectives of the Act; which is to control production, supply and distribution of
85. C. Travasso, ‘India Draws a Red Line under Antibiotic Misuse’, BMJ 352 (2016). https://doi.
org/10.1136/bmj.i1202.
86. See C. Desai, ‘Online Pharmacies: A Boon or Bane?’, Indian Journal of Pharmacology 48(6)
(2016), pp. 615–616; C. D. Parikh et al., ‘An Evaluation of Online Pharmacies for
Compliance to Regulatory Criteria and Price Variation of Listed Medicines’, Journal of
Young Pharmacists, 11(2) (2019), pp. 207–212; P. Musyuni, ‘Regulation of E-pharmacies
in India’, Lexorbis, June 18, 2020. Available at: https://www.lexorbis.com/regulation-of-e-
pharmacies-in-india/ (accessed 12 April 2021).
87. Department of Health and Family Welfare, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Government of India, Draft Drugs and Cosmetics (__ Amendment) Rules, 2018 GSR
817(E) dated 28 August 2018. Available at: http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2018/
189043.pdf (accessed 12 April 2021).
88. ‘Online Medicine Policy May Come After General Polls’, Daily News and Analysis,
February 5, 2019.
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essential commodities).89 The National Institute for Transforming India (NITI Aayog), the
Government of India’s premier think tank, has taken up further drafting.90
Reflections on the current regulatory framework and its enforcement
We have seen that the DCA and Schedules H and H1 of the DCR establish that anti-
biotics can only be sold by or under the personal supervision of a registered pharmacist
against a valid prescription from an RMP. State drug inspectors are responsible for
enforcement of the DCA/DCR. Penalties for violations include fines, imprisonment and
the suspension or cancellation of a pharmacy licence. Another important source of legal
norms is the Pharmacy Act. This specifies that pharmacists must be registered with state
pharmacy councils. The Pharmacy Practice Regulations stipulate that antibiotics can
only be dispensed by a registered pharmacist against a valid prescription. State pharmacy
councils can appoint pharmacy inspectors to enforce these regulations. Penalties can be
issued for offences including falsely claiming to be registered in the state register or
unlawful dispensing by unregistered persons.
On their face, the above regulations governing OTC sales of antibiotics in India
seem reasonably comprehensive in terms of their scope and content and set out
mechanisms for enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance. It is difficult, how-
ever, to construct an accurate and comprehensive picture of the current state of
enforcement. This is because official data in forms such as recorded numbers of
pharmacy inspections and prosecutions across the country or on a state-by-state basis
are not readily available. Analysis of pharmaceutical sales data in Indian private sector
retail pharmacies between 2008 and 2018 indicates a reduction in sales volume of the
antibiotics covered under Schedule H1 of the DCR after 2014 (i.e. when Schedule H1
came in to force).91 This suggests that Schedule H1 has had some impact on sales of the
listed antibiotics. Nevertheless, mystery/simulated/standardised client methodology,
observational studies and interviews with pharmacists offer a different perspective of
the situation on the ground.
For example, a simulated client study conducted in Bangalore, Karnataka, showed
that 174 of 261 pharmacies (66.7%) provided antibiotics without prescription in two
simulated scenarios: an adult complaining of upper respiratory tract infection and a
request for medication for a child who was likely suffering from acute gastroenteritis.92
89. P. Dhankhar, ‘India: Essential Commodities (Control of Unethical Practices in Marketing of
Drugs) Order, 2017: An Overview’, Mondaq, January 30, 2018.
90. R. Negarajan, ‘Law to Punish Pharma Firms that Bribed Doctors Languishing Since 2015’,
The Times of India, April 25, 2018.
91. H.H. Farooqui et al., ‘The Impact of Stringent Prescription-only Antimicrobial Sale
Regulation (Schedule H1) in India: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis, 2008–18’, JAC-
Antimicrobial Resistance 2(3) (2020). https://doi.org/10.1093/jacamr/dlaa076.
92. A. Shet, S. Sundaresan and B.C. Forsberg, ‘Pharmacy-based Dispensing of Antimicrobial
Agents without Prescription in India: Appropriateness and Cost Burden in the Private
Sector’, Antimicrobial Resistance & Infection Control 4(55) (2015). https://doi.org/10.
1186/s13756-015-0098-8.
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These conditions do not generally require antibiotic therapy.93 Similarly, in Tamil Nadu,
observations and interviews with pharmacists at 24 pharmacies revealed that 78.7% of
antibiotics sold within the study period were given without a prescription.94 A focus
group study by Kotwani et al. reported that of 40 New Delhi pharmacists, none said they
refused to sell antibiotics without prescription.95 By contrast, a standardised patient
study conducted in Udupi district, Karnataka, found considerably lower rates of anti-
biotic dispensing without a prescription.96 The results of this latter study offer an impor-
tant counter-point and indicate there may be significant variation in pharmacy practice
geographically. Yet overall, the picture across India appears to be one of widespread
flouting of the regulations governing the sale of antibiotics.97
The way we frame and understand this state of affairs will likely influence our choice
of solutions. If viewed as a straightforward problem of regulatory enforcement, then
traditional and familiar regulatory options will naturally present themselves. A first step
might be to close any gaps in the current regulatory framework (such as the lacunae
relating to e-pharmacies and promotion and marketing by pharmaceutical companies)
through appropriate reforms. Next, we might explore strategies to improve compliance.
One approach would be to enhance surveillance measures. This could include more
frequent inspections of pharmacies and their prescription and sales records. Drug inspec-
tors might also adopt simulated client methodology to check pharmacists’ adherence to
the rules. Another tactic would be to strengthen the sanctions in place to increase their
deterrent effect. This could involve issuing more pharmacy licence suspensions and
increasing the levels of fines for regulatory violations.
Yet although the widespread non-compliance with the regulations for OTC sales of
antibiotics in India is indeed in part a problem of regulatory enforcement, it is important
to recognise that the situation has additional complex dimensions. Behaviours and prac-
tices on both the demand and supply sides that appear ‘irrational’ have emerged as
responses to the economic and structural factors associated with fragile public healthcare
systems.98 Stakeholders’ health and economic and interests may also be impacted pro-
foundly by changes to the status quo. Arguably, regulatory reforms will need to take
account of root causes and anticipate practical ramifications in order to be effective.
93. Kotwani et al., ‘Prescriber and Dispenser Perceptions about Antibiotic Use in Acute
Uncomplicated Childhood Diarrhea and Upper Respiratory Tract Infection in New Delhi’.
94. S.C. Basak and D. Sathyanarayana, ‘Evaluating Medicines Dispensing Patterns at Private
Community Pharmacies in Tamilnadu, India’, Southern Medical Review 3(2) (2010), pp. 27–
31.
95. Kotwani et al., ‘Irrational Use of Antibiotics and Role of the Pharmacist’, p. 310.
96. V. Nafade et al., ‘Over-the-counter Antibiotic Dispensing by Pharmacies: A Standardised
Patient Study in Udupi District, India’, BMJ Global Health 4(6) (2019), p. e001869.
97. A. Kotwani et al., ‘Knowledge and Behavior of Consumers Towards the Non-prescription
Purchase of Antibiotics’.
98. C.F. Rodrigues, ‘Self-medication with Antibiotics in Maputo, Mozambique: Practices,
Rationales and Relationships’, Palgrave Communications 6(6) (2020). https://doi.org/10.
1057/s41599-019-0385-8.
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This is a prominent motif within the Chennai Declaration of 2012; a plan formulated
by a consortium of Indian medical societies to tackle AMR.99 Stressing the need for
practical and realistic solutions within the Indian context, the Declaration asserts that
overzealous enforcement of the ban on OTC sales of antibiotics will likely be unhelpful.
The Declaration therefore called for more nuanced and sophisticated approaches to
regulatory enforcement.
These concerns have been borne out by subsequent developments in India, which
appear to show that regulatory crackdowns may be counterproductive.100 Contestation of
regulations by stakeholders (particularly pharmacists) remain a foreseeable outcome.101
Furthermore, studies assessing the impact of regulatory interventions in other LMICs
highlight that law enforcement measures by themselves might not be effective.102
Approaches that combine law enforcement with measures to increase awareness about
appropriate use of antibiotics and encourage stakeholder participation are more likely to
be fruitful. The following section examines the Indian NAP-AMR and the extent to
which it engages with these themes and ideas.
The National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance
Following the World Health Assembly’s adoption of the WHO GAP on AMR in 2015,
many countries have formulated their own related national action plans. The Indian
NAP-AMR (2017–2022) was published by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
in 2017.103 It represents India’s strategic response to the AMR challenge and is aligned
clearly with the WHO GAP on AMR.104 It incorporates all five of the WHO GAP
‘objectives’ (though these are renamed as ‘strategic priorities’ in the NAP-AMR) and
also adds a sixth strategic priority; namely, to strengthen India’s leadership on AMR (see
Table 1, below). Details are provided through the ‘objectives’, ‘strategic interventions
and activities’ and ‘key outputs’ listed under the six strategic priorities headings.
Two of the strategic priorities set out in the NAP-AMR are particularly relevant to the
regulation of OTC sales of antibiotics for human use in India. Strategic priority 1 is
entitled: ‘Improve awareness and understanding of AMR through effective
99. Ghafur et al., ‘The Chennai Declaration’.
100. D. Karmakar, ‘Druggists Allege Harassment, Call 3-day Strike from January 22’, The Times
of India, January 13, 2020.
101. Sheikh, Saligram and Hort, ‘What Explains Regulatory Failure?’ p. 52.
102. Jacobs et al., ‘Assessing the Impact of Law Enforcement to Reduce Over-the-counter
(OTC) Sales of Antibiotics in Low- and Middle-income Countries’; Wirtz et al.,
‘Analysing Policy Interventions to Prohibit Over-the-counter Antibiotic Sales in Four
Latin American Countries’; also see generally E. Leung et al., ‘The WHO Policy
Package to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance’, Bulletin of the World Health
Organization 89(5) (2011), pp. 390–392.
103. Government of India, ‘NAP-AMR’.
104. J. Ranjalkar and S.J. Chandy, ‘India’s National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance:
An Overview of the Context, Status and Way Ahead’, Journal of Family Medicine and
Primary Care 8(6) (2019), pp. 1828–1834.
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communication, education and training’. Work under this heading will include assessing
the current level of understanding of AMR and antimicrobial use among key stake-
holders. It will offer communication programmes on AMR (e.g. through information
campaigns) to the general population and health professionals. It also proposes revising
the curricula for professionals working in the human health sector and offering training
modules to strengthen capabilities and skills. While increasing awareness of AMR
among Indian stakeholders is a vital step for tackling AMR, education does not always
result in behavioural change. Interventions designed to suit the Indian context will
therefore also be necessary.105
Strategic priority 4 is entitled: ‘Optimize the use of antimicrobial agents in health,
animals and food’. Objective 4.1 aims to: ‘Ensure uninterrupted access to high-quality
antimicrobial medicines’. As part of this, the government proposes to strengthen the
national regulatory authority and regulations regarding use and access to antibiotics. To
enhance regulatory enforcement prohibiting OTC sales of antibiotics under the DCA/
DCR, government bodies will identify unlicensed pharmacies and unqualified medical
practitioners and prescribers. They will also organise studies on antibiotic sales to
understand incentives to sell or buy antibiotics. Also planned is a review of the categor-
isation of high-end antimicrobials as well as new antibiotics in Schedule X/H1 of the
national regulations. The key output under this objective is to strengthen the national
regulatory system and better implement regulations.
Objective 4.4 aims to ‘Improve appropriate use of antimicrobials in the community’. It
proposes that agencies should develop awareness campaigns targeted at prescribers, provi-
ders and dispensers regarding existing rules and laws and appropriate use of antimicrobials.
Awareness campaigns will also be developed that address consumers and the community,
including schools and colleges, focussing on the risks to patients of inappropriate use.
Under objective 4.5, the government plans to ‘Strengthen the legislation regarding
various facets of antimicrobials’. Strategic interventions and activities will include
organising a consultation with regulatory bodies to review current legislation on anti-
microbial prescription and the feasibility of strengthening existing legislation and
Table 1. Strategic priorities outlined in the NAP-AMR.
1. Improve awareness and understanding of AMR through
effective communication, education and training
2. Strengthen knowledge and evidence through surveillance
3. Reduce the incidence of infection through effective infection
prevention and control
4. Optimize the use of antimicrobial agents in health, animals
and food
5. Promote investments for AMR activities, research and
innovations
6. Strengthen India’s leadership on AMR
Note: NAP-AMR: National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance.
105. Op. cit., p. 1830.
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introducing new legislation. Agencies will also be tasked with identifying additional
regulatory interventions or support needed to effectively implement Schedule H1 and
Schedule X restrictions.
These proposals within the NAP-AMR appear positive and helpful. The planned
review of the categories in Schedule H1 of the DCR and the strengthening of the national
regulatory authorities both seem logical steps towards improving compliance. Never-
theless, the Chennai Declaration’s earlier advice that heavy-handed implementation that
fails to take account of stakeholder interests will likely be unhelpful will be important to
bear in mind when engaging in reforms. A further interesting aspect of the NAP-AMR is
that the Indian government acknowledges implicitly that laws and rules by themselves
will probably be insufficient to engender widespread behavioural change. It therefore
recommends the development of additional regulatory interventions or other measures to
support compliance. It is also noteworthy that the government will organise studies to
improve understanding of why people buy or sell antibiotics without prescription. How-
ever, it is not clear how the government will go about these tasks or whether or how
stakeholder input will feed into any upcoming legal reforms or the design or adoption of
interventions aiming to encourage compliance with the norms enshrined within legisla-
tion. There is therefore scope for further discussion on the optimum methodologies for
achieving the objectives set out in the NAP-AMR.
Future directions for regulation
India stands at a crucial junction for modifying its regulatory landscape to tackle the
OTC sales of antibiotics for human use. Following the analysis of the current legal
framework and the proposals in the NAP-AMR, three key themes emerge for discussion
on the best way forward.
Strengthening the regulatory framework
The NAP-AMR points to the need to revise and ‘strengthen’ the regulations and the
national regulatory authority to improve implementation. On these points, it is useful to
reflect on both the capacity of the regulator to enforce regulation and their willingness to
do so. In 2012, a Parliamentary Standing Committee report on the functioning of the
CDSCO highlighted inadequate staffing levels.106 These would impact on the capacity
of statutory authorities to undertake enforcement activities such as conducting regular/
surprise inspections and imposing penalties in case of a breach; especially if there is a very
large number of pharmacies107 and other competing demands on resources. The willing-
ness of the regulator to enforce laws could be influenced by several factors including
106. Rajya Sabha Secretariat, ‘The Functioning of the Central Drugs Standard Control
Organisation (CDSCO)’, Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on
Health and Family Welfare, 59th Report, 8 May 2012. Available at: http://164.100.47.5/
newcommittee/reports/englishcommittees/committee%20on%20health%20and%20
family%20welfare/59.pdf (accessed 12 April 2021).
107. Dua, Kunin and White, ‘The Use of Antimicrobial Drugs in Nagpur, India’.
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corruption, prioritisation of resources and certain enforcement activities over others, and
increased workload. Some regulators may be ambivalent about regulatory goals108 and
turn a blind eye where the consumers do not have access to a medical practitioner for
obtaining a prescription.109 Increased resources and further training for regulatory bodies,
as well as enhanced cooperation among overlapping regulators, could begin to address
these issues, but will not provide a complete solution.
Stakeholder engagement
It is encouraging that the NAP-AMR appears to signal a move away from a top-down,
government-led regulatory reforms, which might fail to take account of the dynamics that
influence behaviour at the community/individual level.110 Robust stakeholder engagement
will ensure that policymakers and regulators have a solid grasp of stakeholder interests and
allow them to test the likely impact of reforms and anticipate levels of compliance. The
insights gained should inform the development of regulatory initiatives.
Elements of this approach to stakeholder engagement are present in India’s NAP-AMR,
for example, in relation to organising ‘studies on antibiotic sales to understand incentives to
sell or buy antibiotics’. Arguably though, more emphasis could be placed on understanding
the commercial and non-commercial interests of all relevant stakeholders. Improved aware-
ness of how stakeholders interact and influence each other may also reveal further possibi-
lities for meaningful regulation. For example, parties other than state agencies – such as
private organisations – might be encouraged to develop roles as surrogate regulators.
Questions also emerge regarding the range of stakeholders included in consultations. In
addition to e-pharmacies, other relevant potential actors include unlicensed medical practi-
tioners and pharmacists, Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeop-
athy (AYUSH) practitioners and informal healthcare providers who lack formal medical
qualifications/training but provide more than 70% of all primary care in rural India and
poor urban areas such as slums.111 It is not clear that the NAP-AMR acknowledges this
latter set of actors as being among the key stakeholders who should receive AMR training.
Non-binding regulation, including soft regulation, could be a way to recognise and engage
with marginalised stakeholders such as alternative/unlicensed medicine practitioners
within the scope of the overall regulatory system in a way that might be palatable to more
formally recognised stakeholders, such as qualified physicians and pharmacists and their
108. Sheikh, Saligram and Hort, ‘What Explains Regulatory Failure?’ p. 52.
109. M.S. Khan, S. Rego and J. Spencer, ‘Prescription Only Access to Antibiotics Could
Exacerbate Health Inequalities in LMICs’, The BMJ Opinion (2018); M. Gautham et al.,
‘What are the Challenges for Antibiotic Stewardship at the Community Level? An Analysis
of the Drivers of Antibiotic Provision by Informal Healthcare Providers in Rural India’,
Social Science & Medicine 275 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.113813.
110. N.K. Ganguly et al., ‘Rationalising Antibiotic Use to Limit Antibiotic Resistance in India’,
Indian Journal of Medical Research 134(3) (2011), pp. 281–294; A. Broom and A. Doron,
‘Antimicrobial Resistance, Politics, and Practice in India’, Qualitative Health Research
30(11) (2020), pp. 1684–1696.
111. Barker et al., ‘Social Determinants of Antibiotic Misuse’.
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professional bodies. Of course, any regulatory initiatives targeting such stakeholders
would need to be designed with sensitivity to political and policy concerns.
Novel regulatory interventions
The NAP-AMR seems to acknowledge the limits of law as a tool to effect social change. It
therefore suggests that government agencies should identify additional regulatory inter-
ventions or support needed to effectively implement Schedule H1 and Schedule X restric-
tions. This opens an interesting opportunity to work with Indian stakeholders to co-design
new types of interventions. The Indian government could also look for inspiration at
approaches that have already been implemented in other LMICs (and even in high-
income countries) and assess their adaptability for the Indian context.
Examples of such interventions can be divided into a number of categories.112 Public
awareness and information campaigns relating to rational use of antibiotics and AMR are
widely recognised as an essential complement to binding regulations. Campaigns are
envisaged within the NAP-AMR and have already been rolled out in India. Yet reports
suggest a degree of confusion among members of the Indian public around some messages
in the campaigns conducted to date.113 Further media campaigns can be pursued on a
sustained basis by relevant government agencies; perhaps in conjunction with NGOs and
civil society organisations. Techniques and principles used successfully in other countries
can also be considered and possibly applied in future campaign designs in India.114
Other interventions implemented outside India have sought to ‘nudge’ stakeholders
through forms of audit and feedback.115 Adopting an approach grounded in behavioural
112. M.M. Thandar et al., ‘Interventions to Reduce Non-prescription Antimicrobial Sales in
Community Pharmacies’, Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews 9 (2020). https://
doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD013722; A. Wilkinson, A. Ebata and H. MacGregor,
‘Interventions to Reduce Antibiotic Prescribing in LMICs: A Scoping Review of
Evidence from Human and Animal Health Systems’, Antibiotics 8(1) (2018). https://doi.
org/10.3390/antibiotics8010002; Jacobs et al., ‘Assessing the Impact of Law Enforcement
to Reduce Over-the-counter (OTC) Sales of Antibiotics in Low- and Middle-income
Countries’; Wirtz et al., ‘Analysing Policy Interventions to Prohibit Over-the-counter
Antibiotic Sales in Four Latin American Countries’.
113. Kotwani et al., ‘Knowledge and Behavior of Consumers towards the Non-prescription
Purchase of Antibiotics’, p. 8.
114. E. Sabuncu et al., ‘Significant Reduction of Antibiotic Use in the Community after a
Nationwide Campaign in France, 2002-2007’, PLoS Med 6(6) (2009). https://doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1000084; A.J. Tamhankar et al., ‘Characteristics of a Nationwide
Voluntary Antibiotic Resistance Awareness Campaign in India: Future Paths and
Pointers for Resource Limited Settings/Low and Middle Income Countries’,
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16(24) (2019).
https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16245141; B. Huttner et al., ‘How to Improve Antibiotic
Awareness Campaigns: Findings of a WHO Global Survey’, BMJ Global Health 4(3)
(2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2018-001239.
115. R.H. Thaler and C.R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and
Happiness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
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science,116 and following successful pilots in 2014–2015, the Chief Medical Officer for
England sends an annual feedback letter to individual General Practitioners (GPs) in
different GP practices with high antibiotic prescribing rates.117 The letters are tailored
according to GP practice prescribing rate, change in prescribing over time and whether
they were previously sent feedback. The intervention has supported GPs to reduce their
prescribing further by providing feedback on practice prescribing rates, offering encour-
agement and suggesting practical actions in a clear and succinct manner.118 Govern-
ments may also introduce financial incentives to reduce prescription of antibiotics. For
instance, in 2015, NHS England introduced rewards to clinical commissioning groups
for a percentage reduction in antibiotic prescribing.119
As the measures described above target inappropriate prescribing by physicians, they
would not appear to be of immediate help in tackling situations where Indian patients are
bypassing doctors and obtain antibiotics without a valid prescription from a pharmacy
directly. Nevertheless, the general ideas behind these physician-centred approaches (i.e.
the provision of targeted information, financial incentives, guidelines and advice) could
be adapted and repurposed to influence pharmacists’ behaviour.
Bespoke interventions have sought to incentivise patients to visit physicians by building
extra value into the process of physician diagnosis and prescribing. After receiving input
from stakeholders in India and Kenya, a human-centred design approach led to the devel-
opment of a digital platform called ‘Smart Prescription’.120 This tool allows prescribers
easy access to international antibiotic prescription guidelines and protocols. It was said to
increase physicians’ confidence during the process of diagnosis. Further benefits are
offered to patients by way of information on symptom management and reminders to take
their medicine sent via text message, as well as an e-prescription that can be filled at
supporting pharmacies. These features were said to improve patient understanding of their
diagnosis and prescription and enhance the desire to obtain a prescription.121
116. Public Health England, Behaviour Change and Antibiotic Prescribing in Healthcare
Settings: Literature Review and Behavioural Analysis (London, UK: PHE, 2015).
117. M. Hallsworth et al., ‘Provision of Social Norm Feedback to High Prescribers of Antibiotics
in General Practice: A Pragmatic National Randomised Controlled Trial’, The Lancet
387(10029) (2016), pp. 1743–1752.
118. M. Ratajczak et al., The Effectiveness of Repeating a Social Norm Feedback Intervention to
High Prescribers of Antibiotics in General Practice: A National Regression Discontinuity
Design’, Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 74(12) (2019), pp. 3603–3610.
119. R. Allison et al., ‘What Antimicrobial Stewardship Strategies do NHS Commissioning
Organizations Implement in Primary Care in England?’, JAC-Antimicrobial Resistance
2(2) (2020). https://doi.org/10.1093/jacamr/dlaa020.
120. Wellcome Trust, ‘Optimising Use of Antibiotics: A Behaviour Change Project in Kenya
and India’. Available at: https://cms.wellcome.org/sites/default/files/optimising-use-
antibiotics-project-learnings.pdf (accessed 12 April 2021).
121. Government of Ghana, Royal Thai Government, UK Government, World Bank Group,
United Nations Foundation, Wellcome Trust, UN Interagency Coordination Group
(IACG), ‘Call to Action on Antimicrobial Resistance 2018’. Available at: https://
wellcome.org/sites/default/files/call-action-antimicrobial-resistance-2018-report.pdf/
(accessed 12 April 2021).
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Advances in diagnostic technologies might also be utilised. There are several point-
of-care (POC) approaches to diagnostic testing for bacterial infections in use or in
development. For example, in 2014 and 2015, a sore throat ‘test and treat’ diagnostic
service for streptococcus group A was piloted at community pharmacies in England.122
Pharmacists who received additional training could conduct on the spot swab tests and
were permitted to supply antibiotics according to predefined dosing schemes. Stake-
holder engagement will help identify possible cost concerns and other barriers to uptake
of POC diagnostic testing in the Indian context.
The Antibiotics Smart Use (ASU) Program was introduced in 2007 in rural Thailand to
reduce unnecessary prescriptions of antibiotics for conditions that do not require antibiotic
treatment.123 Interestingly, one strand of the multifaceted Thai ASU, which engaged
patients through a behavioural change intervention in situ at pharmacies, shows promise
as a way to mitigate the financial disadvantages of AMR initiatives for pharmacists.
Patients complaining of a throat infection were asked to self-diagnose by getting them
to examine their own throat using a tongue depressor, mirror and white light illuminator.124
Patients would compare their own throat to photographs of typical viral and bacterial throat
infections with reference to four clinical criteria. If bacterial infections were not found,
pharmacists would sell alternative treatments to alleviate symptoms. Further stakeholder
engagement around these types of interventions can help quantify the financial interests at
stake and encourage the transition to viable, alternative business practices.
Accreditation programmes may also help encourage behavioural change at pharma-
cies.125 A public–private partnership in Tanzania sought to improve access to quality
medicines and pharmaceutical services in rural areas.126 Pharmacies that participated in
the scheme received training and education on AMR and appropriate use in antibiotics,
as well as benefits such as training in business skills and access to microfinance.127 A key
incentive for owners to become accredited was that they would be legally authorised to
122. T. Thornley et al., ‘A Feasibility Service Evaluation of Screening and Treatment of Group
A Streptococcal Pharyngitis in Community Pharmacies’, Journal of Antimicrobial
Chemotherapy 71(11) (2016), pp. 3293–3299.
123. N. Sumpradit et al., ‘Antibiotics Smart Use: A Workable Model for Promoting the Rational
Use of Medicines in Thailand’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 90(12) (2012),
pp. 905–913.
124. Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, ‘Alliance for Health Policy and Systems
Research Flagship Report 2014, Medicines in Health Systems: Advancing Access,
Affordability and Appropriate Use, Chapter 5, Annex 3 Thailand’s Antibiotic Smart Use
Initiative’. Available at: https://www.who.int/alliance-hpsr/resources/FR_Ch5_Annex3a.
pdf?ua¼1/ (accessed 12 April 2021).
125. Wilkinson, Ebata and MacGregor, ‘Interventions to Reduce Antibiotic Prescribing in
LMICs’, pp. 16–17.
126. R. Valimba et al., ‘Engaging the Private Sector to Improve Antimicrobial Use in the
Community: Experience from Accredited Drug Dispensing Outlets in Tanzania’, Journal
of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice 7(11) (2014). https://doi.org/10.1186/2052-3211-7-
11.
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sell a limited number of antibiotics that would otherwise require a doctor’s prescription.
A review of this intervention reported positive results,128 but issues such as the retention
of pharmacy staff who have undergone AMR training would need to be addressed to
ensure long-term sustainability.129
These kinds of initiatives could form the basis of interventions in India. Alternatively,
original interventions could be developed alongside stakeholder input. The space opened by
the NAP-AMR for innovative and imaginative design should be used to full advantage.
Furthermore, and following the broader definition adopted in this review article,130 it may be
helpful to view resulting interventions as a form of ‘regulation’ in their own right, as opposed
to mere measures that help support the legislative framework. Indeed, such interventions
may have greater impact than legislation in promoting the internalisation of norms and
behavioural change. Due care and attention should therefore be taken in their design and
implementation and ongoing monitoring put in place to evaluate their effectiveness and
detect any unintended consequences.131 More generally, the sharing of information and
experiences within and between countries will help governments and stakeholders resolve
problems and adjust to using less familiar modes of ‘decentred’ regulation.132
Conclusion
Misuse of antibiotics is one of the primary reasons for the emergence of AMR in LMICs
including India, which is one of the world’s largest consumers of antibiotics. Misuse could
result from the actions or inactions of different actors including pharmacists as dispensers of
antibiotics, medical practitioners as prescribers (and sometimes dispensers) of antibiotics,
consumers of antibiotics, as well as manufacturers, sellers and distributors of antibiotics who
also seek to influence the practices and behaviour of the above-mentioned actors.
This article reviewed the existing binding and non-binding regulatory instruments
relating to OTC sales of antibiotics for human use in India, directly or indirectly, that
could contribute to the optimum use of antibiotics and address the AMR challenge. It
found that the Indian government is currently working to close a gap in the regulatory
framework for sales of antibiotics relating to e-pharmacies. Outside these specific areas,
formal rules require a prescription from an RMP for sales of antibiotics and specify the
regulatory actors charged with enforcement. In addition to considering proposals for
128. Valimba et al., ‘Engaging the Private Sector to Improve Antimicrobial Use in the
Community’.
129. O.M. Minzi and V.S. Manyilizu, ‘Application of Basic Pharmacology and Dispensing
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Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice 9(31) (2016). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40545-016-
0083-5; G. Bloom et al., ‘Antimicrobial Resistance and Universal Health Coverage’,
BMJ Global Health 2(4) (2017). http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000518.
132. G. Bloom, S. Henson and D.H. Peters, ‘Innovation in Regulation of Rapidly Changing
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revising the classifications of different antibiotics according to tiered schedules, the
government could move to expand the scope of the regulatory framework governing
the education and practice of pharmacists to incorporate provisions relating to sales of
antibiotics specifically and AMR generally.
The article also emphasised the importance of including a broader range of stake-
holders within the overall regulatory framework, the potential role of non-binding reg-
ulation and the need for stakeholder input into the design of regulatory initiatives. Both
top-down and bottom-up approaches are needed in this context.133 While the challenges
for effective regulation in LMICs such as India are significant, they may be addressed if
researchers, policymakers and regulators combine forces to advance knowledge and
practice around AMR NAPs and their implementation.
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